



State Corporatism in Village Development Planning

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ABSTRACT

This study departs from the problem that state corporatism is the biggest challenge in realizing village authority. The study of state corporatism has been considered obsolete along with the collapse of authoritarian regimes and governments. After authoritarianism in Indonesia, especially after the enactment of Law No. 6 of 2014 on Villages, state corporatism is very strong in gripping village authority. The question posed in this study is to what extent is state corporatism threatening village authority? We used exploratory qualitative methods with case study techniques in Bogem Village, Klaten Regency, Central Java Province, to answer this question—data was collected by observation, in-depth interviews, and document collection. Data analysis uses triangulation techniques, and findings use interpretive and contextual analysis techniques. We found that the state carries out two strategies in corporatism toward villages, namely, a bifrontal strategy and a segmentary strategy. Through these two strategies, village authority and autonomy are weakened in the face of

strengthening the grip of the state or village government through various supra-village programs and policies towards villages.

1. INTRODUCTION

State corporatism in village development planning refers to practices or strategies that involve the government or state in regulating and controlling the process of planning and implementing development at the village level. (Martin, 2005; Regini, 1997) In this context, countries use a variety of programs, policies, and resources to achieve the set development goals. State corporatism in village development planning can manifest in several ways. One of them is to include state programs in village development programs, so that villages become objects or implementers of national policies. (Agus, 2020) This can result in villages losing autonomy and authority in determining the direction of development according to local needs.

In addition, state corporatism can also be seen through the use of village funds to finance central government programs, not to meet the needs and priorities of village development independently. This can reduce village independence and limit flexibility in allocating funds according to local needs. The impact of state corporatism in village development planning is to weaken village authority and reduce community participation and initiative in determining the direction of village development. Village governments can get caught up in serving the interests of the central government or the interests of corporatist associations, rather than focusing on the needs and aspirations of village communities.

This study examines state corporatism in village development planning. State corporatism which many scientists consider to be obsolete, in line with the collapse of authoritarian governments as in Latin America in the 1970s and in Indonesia in 1998, has actually risen again and is a major challenge in realizing village authority (Ho, 2015). The strengthening of state corporatism can be seen from various kinds of state policy instructions such as; Village Standardization in the SDGs and Village Fund Use Policy that shifts village planning patterns. Village planning, which should be participatory and reflect village democracy, is castrated through various state corporatism policies, such as the SDGs which threaten and castrate village authority. We see that the SDGs regulated through Permendes No. 21 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for Community Development and Empowerment are an entry point for widespread state corporatism towards villages which has implications for the death of village authority in development planning (Cardoso & Mendonça, 2012).

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This can be seen from; First, the SDGs castrate village independence and sovereignty, because it ignores participatory planning in the village which has been regulated by Village Law No. 6 of 2014, and kills village democracy. The SDGs rely on the village in making development plans, because the SDGs indicators and standards are not formulated based on the aspirations and interests of the village community, but based on guidelines made by government regulations (Mudhoff, 2011). With the SDGs policy, a village is considered advanced if it meets the SDGs standards, which include regulations on villages without poverty, where the source of funding comes from village funds. This kills the initiative and creativity of the village community in formulating the most appropriate development plan to achieve the welfare of the village community.

In Bogem Village, since 2019, the village has been trapped in various models of state corporatism. The model of state corporatism, among others, is through a series of activities that serve the interests of the central government, such as surveys from BPS, PKK, and from the SDGs themselves. During the SDGs training, village officials questioned the relationship between SDGs and village development planning. However, they admit that the supra-village government policies cannot be rejected by the village government and the village government feels that they are powerless in the face of various pressures from the government above them. The Head of Bogem Village even said; "We are just maids who work to serve the interests of the supra-village government." This answer reflects the strength of state intervention in post-New Order villages. In fact, the post-New Order state has undergone many changes, in relation to villages, where the post-New Order state has transformed from state-led development to society-led development (Sahdan et al., 2022).

Another model of state corporatism towards villages can also be found through village fund policies. Before Covid-19 the village government was struggling with the village administration process, accompanied by pressure from the village fund assistant which is a state instrument in the village (Howard, 1978). The village government feels that it has no discretion in using village funds because it always has to comply with what is the village assistant's guidelines. Even though village funds are central government recognition of villages whose usage authority is highly dependent on the village (Eko, 2022), as mandated by Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages. In many cases, the use of village funds is not carried out in accordance with the aspirations of the Village Deliberation (MUSDES), but based on the instructions and guidelines that have been made by the central government. In this context, the state holds the village hostage with recognition which is only a formality.

The village government is often summoned by the Inspectorate and BPKP (Financial and Development Supervisory Agency) for alleged findings of the use of village funds that are not in accordance with the instructions and instructions of the central government.(Ombudsman, 2019) The central government issues various instructions that provide instructions or guidelines for the use of village funds such as Presidential Regulation Number 104 of 2021, without considering village recognition authority and without considering the conditions in each village which are different in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. In the Perpres on the Use of Village Funds, it is stipulated that if no vulnerability to the Covid-19 pandemic is found, then the unused budget is returned to the state treasury.

Social scientists consider that corporatism is the main character played by authoritarian governments (Schmitter, 1986). But we ourselves see that state corporatism is not the monopoly of authoritarian governments, but is also carried out by democratically elected governments. This can be seen from how democratic governments elected through regular elections in several countries try to commit state corporatism towards society.(Grunig & Jaatinen, 1999) Post-authoritarianism, in Indonesia and in several countries the growth and development of state corporatism has experienced renewal and is even more sophisticated and neater under a government that calls itself a "democratic government". Lucio Baccaro said that in many countries, such as Sweden, state corporatism is undergoing renewal. Barcco said that; "Corporatism has begun the new millennium in remarkably good shape, especially if one considers that only a few years ago it had been pronounced dead.¹ The early pessimistic analyzes appear to have been influenced by the 1983 breakup of centralized collective bargaining in Sweden, widely considered the prototypical case of corporatism" (Baccaro, 2002).

In post-New Order Indonesia, state corporatism strengthened in the form of policy institutionalization carried out by various sectoral ministries and through the dissemination of programs such as SDGs, stunting, villages without poverty and so on, which were made by the ministries of BAPPENAS, the Ministry of Health and so on, where the funds were taken from funds village. Schmitter himself defines state corporatism as an institutionalized pattern of policy formation (Schmitter, 1986). Meanwhile, Baccaro defines state corporatism as a form of state expansion that is carried out both formally and informally to gain public support and loyalty to the ruling government (Baccaro, 2002).

Wiarda said that corporatism requires a social system and political organization in which community groups and major interests are integrated into the government system, which is often on a monopoly basis

under state guidance, supervision, and control, to achieve coordinated national development (Wiarda, 2009). Previously, Wiarda explained that in a corporatist political system, power is concentrated in the hands of the state, which mediates relations between major social groups by recognizing certain organizations as legitimate and the only representatives of the interests of their members. These officially recognized interest groups, organized along functional lines into corporatist associations, can then enjoy the benefits offered by the state, including access to resources and the ability to make state demands through routine channels. In return, the state expects to exercise authority and control over the kinds of demands made by corporatist associations, and even a degree of control over them. The main objective of this corporatist framework is to enable the state to function in managing change and maintaining order and harmony in society. Corporatism maintains and even expands the power and interests recognized by the state in the power structure where they enjoy certain privileges that are not given to other people (Wiarda, 1973).

State-society relations in medieval Spain and Portugal were arranged in a pyramid shape. The king sits at the top of the pyramid, with the corporatist groups marching below him and everyone else below them. Power and privilege radiated from the king to the corporatist groups below him. The corporatization of groups is meant to be non-competitive, but in reality, a great deal of jockeying for power and influence occurs within and between them. Wiarda emphasizes the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of this society, in which power is concentrated among a small group of elite interests and in which individualism is subordinated to group identity.

Groups not recognized by the state were suppressed. Notions of individual freedom and rights are ignored. The rights of people who are inherently conservative and seek to preserve a segmented political order that protects the status quo are not given much space. Wiarda argues that medieval Catholicism, namely in Spain and Portugal, exported corporatism to Latin America. The emphasis on centralized authority, hierarchical relationships, group rights over individual rights, and obedience to authority are all baked into the ethos of Latin American culture and take into account its peculiarities. This is in stark contrast to the British colonies, where the ideas of liberalism, with its emphasis on Protestantism, individual rights, diffuse authority, and equality, were ultimately rooted in society given a broad place. (Wiarda & Mott, 2001)

According to Schmitter, corporatism is divided into two namely; Community corporatism (social corporatism) is characterized by a relatively autonomous system of representation or interest associations, where activities and support for the government (state) are the main sources of political legitimacy. Meanwhile, state corporatism is characterized by government penetration or supervision (control) of interest representatives or associations (Chen, 2018). Muhtar Mas'oeed, provides the main distinction between the two distinct subtypes namely pure corporatism, in which the legitimacy and functioning of the state mainly or exclusively depend on the activity of a single, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered representative "enterprise" and subordinate corporatism, in which similarly structured "corporations" are created by and kept in addition to and dependent on the organs of the state which establish their legitimacy and function effectively on other grounds. Muhtar Mas'oeed said that corporatism was carried out in two ways, namely by way of bifrontal and segmentary (Mas'oeed, 2003).

In village development planning, corporatism plays a very big role in smoothing out central government programs and policies in village development. Raffiudin explained that development can be interpreted as a process that has a direction with the goal of increasing living standards and greater ability to be economically independent. (Damayanti & Syarifuddin, 2020) From an orthodox perspective, development theory refers to the experience of Western European society and economy, where modernization includes phenomena: industrialization, urbanization, and the use of technology in various economic sectors. While socio-culturally, modernity is associated with rationality as a way of understanding world reality. (Padhil & Purnomo, 2018) The concept of rationality has played a very significant role in the history of thought and also social change in Europe so as a thought about the movement of capitalist society that has grown in Europe since the 15-16 centuries, social development has a very dominant influence.

Along with the emergence of newly independent countries after the Second World War, there was a change in the orientation and interests of countries that had already carried out capitalist development. Development relations between developed countries in the north and poor countries in the south were previously dominated by the process of seeking economic profit by seeking and extracting natural resources and other raw materials, as well as opening new markets in countries that experienced colonial occupation. (Fukuyama, 2013) The new orientation gives confidence that if developed countries provide strong financial and technical development support for traditional societies that depend on agriculture (agriculture), poor countries can be transformed into modern industrial societies (Raffiudin et al, 2020).

In line with the enactment of Law no. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages, villages are given the authority to regulate and manage villages. The study conducted by Gregory Sahdan in the book; "Strong Sovereign

Village" shows that village autonomy has not fully worked. In village development planning, not all village community aspirations and proposals are accommodated in village planning documents. In the MUSDES, the aspirations and will of the community are sometimes ignored in order to smooth out the programs and policies of the central and supra-village governments (Sahdan, 2019). The central government often does not recognize and respect village authorities as stipulated in Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning villages. This causes villages to carry out more programs mandated by the central government, not programs that are desired or mutually agreed upon with the community in four village planning arrangements such as the MUSDES. (Budi Karyati, 2016; ip.apmd.ac.id, 2021) The MUSDES is bland because it only approves programs planned by the central government with budgetary resources originating from village finances. We call this model state corporatism under the administration of President Joko Widodo.

In Klaten, state corporatism is strengthened by the Klaten Regent's Instruction Number 3 of 2021, one of which orders the sub-district head to prepare a centralized sub-district isolation area where funds are sourced from contributions collected by each village (Mona, 2020). The various models and characteristics of state corporatism, of course, have implications for many things, including weakening village authority, the recognition given by the central government to villages is not working and the worst thing the death of community initiatives and initiatives in village development planning.

This study chose Bogem Village as the research location due to several considerations. *First*, Bogem Village is one of the villages where the practice of state corporatism through government regulations is being implemented; *Second*, based on observations and through previous interviews conducted by us with village heads and village officials, they argued that Bogem Village was helpless in opposing various regulations that trapped villages in state corporatism made by the central government; and *Third*, the Bogem Village Government is experiencing confusion in carrying out various corporatism policies made by the central government.

This study found strong indications of community exclusion in village development planning, where their voices were no longer accommodated in various forms of village development planning which should have been a space for the imagination and consolidation of village community interests. Therefore, there is a need for research on how state corporations occur in the scope of the village development planning process, so that solutions can be found from the occurrence of state corporations in village development planning. The question posed in this study is how state corporatism occurs in village development planning. The main objectives of this study are: (1) to describe how state corporatism is in village development planning; (2) socializing to the intelligence community and the academic community that corporatism which was considered obsolete after the collapse of the New Order state still occurs in villages; (3) describes the new neo-corporatism with a different strategy from the old corporatism model found in Latin America and in Indonesia during the New Order era.

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2. METHOD

This research uses exploratory qualitative methods with a case study type of research. The location of this research was conducted in Bogem Village, Bayat District, Klaten Regency. Data were collected by observation, in-depth interviews and document collection. The informants in this study were determined using purposive techniques consisting of (1) village government; (2) Village Consultative Bodies; (3) Village planning stakeholders (community leaders, youth leaders, women leaders and regional representatives) of Bogem Village. Data analysis is carried out using the content analysis method. Soleymannpour's opinion that the content analysis method is a qualitative method "The research examined textbooks and written materials that contained information about the targeted events, using case analysis and qualitative research methods for the document review process" (Soleymannpour & Kiadaliri, 2014). Research that examines textbooks and written materials in textbooks that contain information to be researched, this study uses case analysis and qualitative research methods for documents.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Identify Village Needs

This study found that state corporatism in village development planning occurs in the form of institutionalization of policies made by cross-sectoral ministries towards villages. The institutionalization of this cross-sectoral policy is reflected in the Stunting policy from the Ministry of Health, the SDGs Policy from BAPPENAS, quality education from the Ministry of Education, and so on which originate from sectoral ministries. In its implementation, the institutionalization of this policy by the sectoral ministries caused the depletion of village funds for sectoral ministry activities in the village. This has implications for village authorities in making village development plans. Planning for village development as in the Village Deliberation (MUSDES) is just a formality. (Syauqi, 2022) Village development planning which is controlled by the state through sectoral ministry programs, which Schmitter calls policy institutionalization, causes village space to optimize its authority to be limited, as stated by the Bogem Village government. On the other hand, this also reflects the widespread expansion of the country under the administration of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Referring to John Gerring, the expansion of the state which is too large in village development planning, causes an expansion of state power which reduces village power and kills the inclusion of village democracy (Gerring & Thacker, 2008). Institutionalization of state policy also causes a pyramid of power in the village, where the village submits and obeys the supra-village government through acceptance of various programs made by the government above it. In Bogem village, this pyramid of power was formed through the obedience of the village head and village officials to approve and implement sectoral ministry programs so that they were financed with village funds. This causes village funds to be used up for the success of sectoral ministry programs compared to carrying out village community program proposals in the MUSDES. This model gave birth to a pattern of power concentrated in the hands of the village government, as a determinant of policies and programs that can be implemented in the village.

Here, the state becomes very corporatist, especially when various state programs and policies are forced to be carried out by the village. Corporatism towards villages, as in Bogem Village, was carried out using two strategies, namely the segmenter strategy and the bifrontal strategy. Through the segmenter strategy, the state includes policies on stunting, SDGs, quality education and so on that are forced to be carried out by villages and whose funding comes from village funds. Through a bifrontal strategy, the state incorporates rural communities into a pseudo-planning model that is only formal in nature. (Eko Yunanto, 2022) This model causes the village to feel powerless in dealing with the government above it. Using Schmitter's point of view, we found that there were two forms of corporatism that developed in Bogem Village, namely corporatism with a social pattern and corporatism with a state pattern. Corporatism with a social pattern can be found in various kinds of community activities that are controlled by the state. Meanwhile, state-style corporatism can be seen from the village meetings or MUSDES which only discuss programs originating from central government policies. In Klaten Regency itself, this model of corporatism is strengthened by the Klaten Regent's Instruction Number 3 of 2021, one of which orders the sub-district head to prepare a centralized isolation area for the sub-district where funds are sourced from contributions collected by each village.

Role and Plan of Village Development

This study found that state corporatism in village development planning occurs in three forms, namely: First, through the policy of using village funds, where villages are forced to use village funds to provide assistance to communities affected by Covid-19, as stated in the Regulation of the Minister of Villages, Development Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration No. 7 of 2021 concerning Priority for Use of Village Funds for 2022. The plans and agenda that have been discussed at the MUSDES are like a blur in the wind due to policy intervention by the government namely 40 percent of village funds are used for assistance to communities affected by Covid-19. Villages are given artificial authority and this castrates village authority so that it becomes difficult for villages to realize the needs that have been discussed.

The second, Village SDGs program initiated by the Ministry of Villages are a picture that erodes village sovereignty. It can be seen that villages are required to follow what the Ministry of Village wants. Even though the village is hierarchically under the auspices of the village ministry, the village itself has been given the authority to regulate and manage its own household. (Eko, 2022) The third is related to digital village policies. The digital village is an indicator of village progress and village modernity. Technology is considered the spearhead in improving services to the community. Bagus Putu's research, in Kerta Village, Gianyar Regency, sees information technology as an aspect that really helps public services in the village (Bagus Putu, 2020). But unfortunately, a lot of village funds are absorbed into digital village policies which makes village planning meaningless. Our study found that digital village policies did not have many benefits for village communities. Parties who benefit the most from digital village policies are village officials whose job is to input data into the village information system application (Alexiadou, 2018). Village officials tasked

with inputting this data receive money from the village fund, which is around 20 percent of the village fund. This causes village funds not to be widely accessed and used for the benefit of the community. The community's right to obtain empowerment and capacity building by the village was largely ignored when the village government was only busy administering and inputting data into the village information system ordered by the central government. The Bogem village government itself feels used and sees that the village digitalization policy only enslaves the village government.

Fourth, state corporatism in village development planning in Bogem Village, is also demonstrated by the fact that the supra-village government through the PAUD, Posyandu, and Pustu programs intervened by including budgets for PAUD, Posyandu, and Pustu staff sourced from village funds. The goal is that these officers obtain welfare guarantees, have easy work, and can provide maximum service to the community. Funds for activities like this should have come from related ministries such as the Ministry of Health for Posyandu and Pustu, but unfortunately, all of this is borne by the village budget. On the other hand, villages, such as what happened in Bogem Village, are forced to create health services to take care of stunting, which is a national program and often has no correlation with conditions in the village, but the program must be carried out because if it follows the rules that have been set then villages can be branded as dissidents from the central policy. Dahlan Tampubolon's findings in two villages in Rokan Hulu Regency and one village in Kampar Regency that stunting implementation is still slow at the village level because the village head's attention is more on infrastructure than stunting intervention (Tampubolon, 2020), is actually contrary to village authority which should take care of and managing affairs related to village authorities mandated in the Village Law (Pahlevi, 2022). Our findings in Bogem Village show that; (1) state corporatism through the institutionalization of policies carried out by sectoral ministries ensnares villages, weakens village authority, makes village democracy ineffective, and kills village initiatives and initiatives; (2) the expansion of state programs such as stunting, SDGs, villages without poverty and so on, makes the village lose its recognition authority to make village development planning programs based on the interests of the local community.

This study found that corporatism committed by the state towards villages in Bogem Village occurred in two ways, namely by way of segmentation and by way of bifrontal. State corporatism is carried out in a segmented way, among others, through groups developed by the state in villages. These groups are classified based on certain issues that the state wants to resolve at the village level, such as groups of recipients of the Covid-19 Village Fund BLT, target community groups for quality village education programs, community groups that are the object of the village alert program and so on. The segmented and bifrontal strategies carried out by the state through sectoral ministries have caused participatory village planning not to work as mandated in the Village Law.

State corporatism in segmented and bifrontal forms is also carried out by holding various programs, including; Village SDGs, priority use of village funds, stunting program and larva monitoring agent, abbreviated as JUMANTIK. The SDGs, which are a program from the central government, are carried out in the form of village data collection with the aim of knowing village conditions, but in practice, it turns out that funds are used from village finances, not from central government finances. The village government as the smallest government was forced and required to do what was instructed by the regional and central government, even though it was not in accordance with the conditions in Bogem Village. Several residents of Bogem Village are aware of the existence of the SDGs program but do not know the use and benefits of the data required by the central government. Even though the village is hierarchically under the auspices of the Village Ministry, the village itself has been given the authority for village independence through the Village Law. The SDGs Desa project which was carried out in 2020 indicated that villages must fulfill the data determined by the Ministry of Villages, including funds for a census of the community using the APBDes. Forms of state corporatism can be seen from the 18 SDGs points stipulated in Permendes No. 21 of 2020 concerning Guidelines for Community Development and Empowerment, particularly in article 6 paragraph 1, which regulates SDGs which include; villages without poverty, hunger, healthy and prosperous villages, quality village education and so on.

This arrangement is a form of state corporatism towards villages which has implications for weakening village authority. We found that state corporatism that was carried out against villages, as happened in Bogem Village, had implications for; (1) the loss of initiative and creativity of the village community in organizing and managing their village; (2) every day the village becomes busy to carry out programs instructed by the central government; (3) the village has lost the direction of village development, where more village development planning has been neglected in favor of carrying out government programs; (4) the village returns to work to serve the government above it, not serving the community; (5) recognition and subsidiarity as a form of state recognition of villages are ignored. Our findings show that there are two strategies of state corporatism in village development planning as described in the Table 1, which make villages powerless and work only to serve the interests of the supra-village government.

Table 1. Deep State Corporatism Village Development Planning

No	Segment Strategy	Bifrontal Strategy
1	Savings Program Prosperous Family (Group)	Instructions President (INPRES) Number 7 of 2014 concerning the Implementation of the Savings Program Prosperous Families, the Smart Indonesia Program, and the Healthy Indonesia Program For Build Family productive.
2	Group Village Child Worthy	Regulation Regent Klaten Number 19 of 2015 about Village Child Worthy.
3	Group Work (POKJA) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).	Regulation Minister of Villages, Development Area Left Behind , And Transmigration Republic of Indonesia Number 13 of 2020 concerning Priority Use of Village Funds in 2021.
4	Group DD BLT Recipients	Regulation Minister of Villages, Development Area Left Behind , And Transmigration Republic of Indonesia Number 13 of 2020 concerning Priority Use of Village Funds in 2021.
5	JUMANTIK Group	Decree of the Minister of Health number 581/MENKES/SK/VII/1992 concerning Eradication of Fever Dengue bleeding
6	Stunting Reduction Program Group	Regulation President Number 72 of 2021 concerning Acceleration Stunting Reduction

Table 1 explains that state corporatism in a segmented way through groups formed by the state in villages aims to intervene in villages. While the bifrontal method is through rules established by the central government, provincial, and district/city governments. State corporatism is carried out in various strategies, including; First, the Prosperous Family Savings Program (PSKS), which is a government effort to improve the standard of living of the poor by providing cash assistance. This assistance is provided in the form of a savings account as part of the national financial inclusion strategy. Previously there was a Direct Cash Assistance (BLT) program which was handed over directly in cash to the community, but the delivery mechanism was inefficient, then it was updated with the PSKS program. PSKS is expected to help the community in the short and long term. The short-term impact is to increase family economic resilience where currently prices of basic necessities continue to increase. In the long term, this assistance program can be used as initial capital to create small-medium businesses for recipients. However, this kind of assistance program creates people's dependence on the government and social jealousy because it is often not on target. The Village Government as the layer of government closest to the community often becomes the scapegoat when jealousy occurs between residents who do not receive assistance and recipients of assistance. Most people think that the people who receive assistance are people who are close to village officials, even though the data and funds come directly from the central government. This also causes conflicts of interest and social jealousy that occur between people in the village.

Second, the Child-Friendly Village Group. This program has the intention of inspiring village governments to develop initiatives in developing visions, missions, programs, policies, activities, and institutions that are more concerned and sensitive to the interests of children so that children's rights are guaranteed. Klaten Regency has Regent Regulation Number 19 of 2015 concerning General Guidelines for the Development of Children's Participation in Development. This regulation gives orders to the authorized village at the lowest level of government to realize the child-friendly program. An important part of the Child Friendly Village Group is the Integrity Pact. The purpose of the Integrity Pact is to seek agreement from adults to avoid negative things from children, such as smoking, alcohol and so on. In addition, adult citizens must have a commitment to provide protection to children until they grow up and can choose the lifestyle they want. In making the Integrity Pact, of course, the village is very difficult, because the position of the village does not have the authority to give legal sanctions to adults who smoke and drink alcohol.

Third, the POKJA SDGs, where the Village SDGs are the government's effort to create sustainable community welfare starting from the economy, health, environment, education, and so on. The parties involved in realizing the SDGs program are the Village Working Group, District/City Regional Government, Provincial Government, Ministry of Villages, PDT, and Transmigration. With reference to Permendesa PDTT No 21/2020, Village POKJA includes the village head as supervisor, village secretary as chairman, head of village government as secretary of POKJA and members consisting of elements of village apparatus, head of RT/RW, youth organization, PKK, and the people who are ready. One of the activities carried out by the LWG is to collect data. Currently, data processing and analysis is carried out electronically by the Village Information System developed by the Ministry of Villages, PDT, and Transmigration. However, this data is difficult for the public to access and has little impact on people's welfare. In fact, quite a lot of village funds are used to input data needed by the central government.

Fourth, the Village Fund BLT Recipient Group, where the Village Fund Direct Cash Assistance (BLT-DD) is one of the government's policies to reduce the impact of the co-19 pandemic for underprivileged families and families who have not received assistance from the central government. This assistance was handed over directly by the village head to the community, even though this program came from the center. Village Fund Direct Cash Assistance is given once a month in the amount of 300,000 rupiahs. Direct Cash Assistance is given after the decline in village funds. There should have been several stages before the distribution was carried out and considered by the village government. The village government together with the RT/RW must conduct a direct survey of the people they feel entitled to receive. However, the facts on the ground, such as in Bogem village, the village government has received beneficiary data from the central government. As a result, many are misdirected. Another negative impact, the provision of direct cash assistance to village funds, has caused village programs in the field of development and community empowerment to stagnate, because village funds have run out for community assistance. Bogem Village then experienced difficulties implementing the village planning that had been prepared and agreed upon at the Village Deliberation.

Fifth, JUMANTIK or Juru Pemantau Larvae is a program that provides an opportunity for officers who carry out checking, monitoring and eradicating mosquito larvae, especially those that cause dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF). The JUMANTIK program that emerged under the auspices of the health office has the aim of minimizing DHF cases that occur in village communities. In addition, the JUMANTIK program is also expected to create a clean environment so as to avoid various viruses and germs, especially to prevent the *Aedes Aegypti* mosquito from breeding. According to information from a JUMANTIK cadre in Bogem Village, this program is not a village original program. This means that the village only accepts assignments from agencies whose level is higher than the village. JUMANTIK in Bogem Village has only been running for three months and has several posts with each post covering two RWs. In carrying out their duties as mosquito larva monitors, village-level cadres receive a wage of 25,000 rupiahs. Every time the checking activity. This funding is taken out of village financial sources and causes village funds to run out for the benefit of the supra-village government. The people themselves feel that this program has had little impact on their economic life and only spends village funds. Village funds that are considered very large are actually being used for various central government programs.

Sixth, Stunting Prevention. Stunting is a case of chronic malnutrition in children. This problem is caused because children do not get adequate nutrition for a long time. Therefore, the central government focuses on preventing stunting. The implementation of this program also sucked up the use of village funds. The implication is that large village funds are used up to make sectoral ministry programs in the village successful.

Through these various sectoral ministry programs, the state in recent years has proven to have organized the corporatization of villages through two main strategies, namely the segmenter strategy and the bifrontal strategy. The implication of this state corporatism is that village planning is only a formality and the inclusion of village democracy does not work as mandated by the Village Law.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

State corporatism in village development planning has diminished village authority and delegitimized the spirit of recognition mandated by the state in village law. The strategy of state corporatism is carried out through incorporating state programs into village programs and using village funds, so that village governments are trapped into servants of supravillages instead of communities. Village development planning needs to be restored as an arena for village democracy by stopping state corporatism, ensuring government financial support that enters the village, and financing village authority with village funds. Village authority needs to be restored in governance, development, and community empowerment based on village authority, as well as ensuring village community initiatives and initiatives are accommodated. Villages should be treated as subjects rather than objects in village governance, and villages need to take a greater role in overcoming their villages' problems. State corporatism today is dominated by state interests that control the political economic resources of the village. If it continues to happen, village government that prospers and prospers the community is difficult to realize. The village is still not fully recognized as a subject that functions the same as other governments in achieving community welfare. State corporatism towards villages in segmentary and bifrontal form has killed village democracy and made village planning a mere formality.

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